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CENTRAL AMERICA: Military	Offensive in El Salvador
tiative in order to upset insur Meanwhile, the Guatemalan Gover with opposition parties protest	lvador are taking the military ini- gent plans to disrupt the elections. nment appears headed for a showdown ing the election of General Guevara. efense has expressed concern that the ually spread to his country.//
sive against a major insur part of the country. Almo	as begun a large-scale offen- gent base area in the central st 2,000 troops are involved in aunched with unusual security ng off the guerrillas.
The base area is a ke insurgent supplies through	y point in the distribution of
	or an attack on <u>one of the</u>
a potential staging area fremaining bridges across t Comment: The Army's ently upset insurgent plan	most recent offensive appars to attack San Salvador, and guerrilla raids on cities in
a potential staging area fremaining bridges across t Comment: The Army's ently upset insurgent plan this operation may disrupt	most recent offensive appars to attack San Salvador, and guerrilla raids on cities in eastern regions.
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Comment: The Army's ently upset insurgent plan this operation may disrupt the country's central and Postelection Crisis in Gua All three opposition strations of protest again a daily one-hour work stop culminate in a massive demonstrations of description accordingly.	most recent offensive appars to attack San Salvador, and guerrilla raids on cities in eastern regions. temala leaders are calling for demonst electoral fraud, including page. These protests are to onstration on Monday, the day

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Comment: A general strike supported by business and labor groups would embarrass the government but would not jeopardize Guevara's accession to the presidency. The Army shows every intention of using whatever force is needed to silence dissent over the election results. In the event of a strike or additional clashes between the security forces and the regime's opponents, the government probably will declare a state of siege.	25X
Mexican Concern	•
//Mexican Secretary of Defense General Galvan recently told a US official that he is convinced that the insurgency in Guatemala will eventually have an impact on Mexico's internal security. Although Galvan acknowledged that some members of the government prefer to ignore the problems posed by guerrilla activity along the border with Guatemala, he said that he intends to do his best to maintain control there.//	25X
//Galvan claimed to have reached an agreement late last month with his Guatemalan counterpart that will ensure greater bilateral cooperation. He also expressed a willingness to exchange information with the US on Guatemalan guerrilla operations.//	25X
Comment: //Galvan's comments reflect growing anxiety among senior Mexican military officials over the spread of insurgency in Central America and highlight differences in the government over Central American policy. Nevertheless, Mexican policymakers probably will continue to resist efforts for more effective military cooperation with Guatemala.//	25X

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USSR: Debate Over Investment Strategy	
A recent Pravda article indicates that the debate is continuing over the investment priorities adopted last November in the five-year plan, which ends in 1985.	25 X 1
Prominent Soviet economist Abel Aganbegyan criticizes what he views as the insufficient expansion of capacity for production of more and better quality machinery, which, he maintains, is crucial to regain the higher rates of growth of the past. Growth below this level would prevent the USSR from raising living	÷
standards.	25 X 1
Aganbegyannoting manpower shortages, a planned smaller share of output devoted to investment, and the rising cost of extracting natural resourcesstresses the familiar theme that growth now heavily depends on raising output per worker. This, he says, can be attained only through much more rapid modernization and mechanization of industry. The Soviets, however, have been allocating only a small share of total investment to the machinery sector.	25X1
Comment: The publication of the article in Pravda suggests support for these views within the top leadership, particularly from party Secretary Kirilenko, who has been the strongest supporter in the Politburo of machine-building. The dispute is not over the rate of growth of investment but over whether to allocate more to machinery, with less going to such sectors as land reclamation, chemicals, metallurgy, timber, and coal. These and other sectors, Kirilenko would argue, would benefit in the longer run.	25X1
The shifts might well create new bottlenecks or intensify old ones. Moreover, they would have to come at the expense of growth in other sectors, thereby antagonizing powerful interest groups.	25X1
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USSR-IRAN: Sign of Soviet Displeasure	
Moscow's latest public displeasure over relations with Iran appears designed to caution Tehran that it will have to take new actions if the situation is to improve. An article in Pravda this week acknowledges improved economic cooperation but lists grievances against Iran. Among other things, it cites the reduction of Soviet diplomatic personnel in Tehran, the unilateral termination of the Society of Soviet-Iranian Cultural Relations, and the anti-Soviet rhetoric of Iranian media. The commentary also criticizes "conservative factions" in the leadership for obstructing closer bilateral relations.	25X
Comment: The article appears to be a warning that Moscow's tolerance for anti-Soviet actions is limited and that Tehran should meet the USSR halfway if it wants continued economic and military support. The Soviets may hope that Iran's current economic problem will provide the necessary impetus for improving political relations. The singling out of "conservative elements" may be aimed at weakening their positions in relation to the factions that apparently favor closer cooperation with the USSR.	25X
EC: Roadblock to Sanctions Removed	
//Denmark's agreement to drop its procedural reservation against EC restrictions on imports from the USSR removes the final roadblock to carry out the EC sanctions that were put in final form late last week. The measures reportedly will be imposed early next week by all EC members except Greece, which continues to oppose sanctions.//	25X
Comment: //Other EC members probably convinced Copenhagen to drop its objection because of the minimal effect sanctions would have on Denmark's trade and because of the increasing pressures on the EC from Washington to take action.//	25X
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GREECE: Socialist Budget
The government's first proposed budget projects a deficit of \$4 billion, almost 10 percent of GNP. According to press reports, expenditures are to rise by 35 percent-roughly 10 percent in real termsincluding increases of 27 percent for defense spending, 15 percent for salary and pension costs, and 42 percent for social welfare. Higher taxes are expected to produce a 58-percent increase in revenues, which would reduce the deficit by 5 percent.
Comment: Revenue projections probably are too optimistic, particularly if output remains depressed. In addition, salary and pension expenditures, which comprise over one-third of the budget, almost certainly will rise more than projected because of large raises already granted to lower income workers and government promises to index wages. Prime Minister Papandreou sees this budget as creating favorable conditions for the five-year development plan beginning in 1983, but, with falling private investment, income redistribution, and an inflationary budget, economic problems are likely to intensify by the end of the year.
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UK: Amphibious Ships Retained	
//The government has decided to keep two ling ships that were to be scrapped, but it evid will go through with the sale of a carrier to A The carrier is to be delivered in late 1983, af sister ship becomes operational. The UK has classes that by keeping the ships it will maintain amphibious capability at the current level.//	ently ustralia. ter a aimed to
Comment: //All major amphibious ships were taken out of service by 1985, and the UK would difficulty fulfilling its NATO mission of rapid forcing the northern flank or moving intervention outside the NATO area. Retaining the two ships help but will not stop the decline of UK amphibicapabilities. Both Royal Navy officials and Combackbenchers apparently are resisting the decisisell the carrier, and the government may have an in order to counter parliamentary opposition to	have had ly rein- on forces will ious nservative ion to cted now
CHINA: Accelerated Population Growth	
Beijing is forecasting a birth rate of abordent per year for each of the next two years, up average of about 1.8 percent for each of the lawyears. With a population of about 1 billion at ginning of this year, this would result in an accordance of some 28 million people by the end of 1983. In now admits that the "one-child-per-couple" police to be changed to make family planning more accept and realistic. Some provinces recognize that may the household rather than the commune the key accordance to the production unit and assigning land on a perbasis encourage large families.	p from an st two the be-ddition Beijing cy needs ptable aking gricul-
Comment: The more rapid increase in popular results in part from a higher proportion of coup child bearing age in the population, a new law the legal age for marriage, and the effects of toultural policy. The new trend threatens to prechina from achieving its goal of keeping the population of the century it will further impede economic development.	ples of lowering the agri- event oulation

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS		
TURKEY: Leadership Problems		
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//There are signs of serious di for the first time since the military differences focus on how the regime s domestic critics and have led General Security Council, to tighten his grip own. The government's tough response criticism also has heightened misgivilabor leaders normally inclined to suresentment could eventually focus on viewed as the regime's principal supp	should deal with foreign and levren, chief of the National point on power and act more on his e to domestic and West European ings among intellectuals and upport the military. Their the US, which increasingly is	, 25X
//Evren's consolidation of step divisions in the Council a ambitions. He apparently calculated against West European critics we presidency once civilian rule in	ulates that a hard line will help him win the	25X
		25X
		*
scope of its domestic crackdown arrested 44 prominent individual attorney for jailed union members.	eals, including the defense pers and a former ambassador,	ĵ
on charges ranging from Communiout against government policies	es.//	25X
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//Some prominent civilians who have supported or at least acquiesced in previous restrictions imposed by the regime believe the generals may have overstepped their bounds in this case.	25)
The press, meanwhile, has begun to criticize the government more directly and for the first time is mentioning Evren by name.//	25X1 25)
The Turks are accustomed to periodic elections and public debate on significant issues and are not likely to condone many more restrictions of their civil liberties. Continued strong-arm tactics will further erode the regime's support among politically active groups. Evren's personal popularity also is likely to wane as he and his government's policies come under increasing fire from civilians looking to the resumption of political activity next year.	25)
//The real danger to the military leadership and its mission, however, comes from within the government itself. There are already indications that police and security forces are implementing laws and decrees in ways that will not be incriminating once the civilian rule is restored. Such jockeying for position probably will hinder the campaign against terrorism and attempts to reform the political system.//	25)
	257
//In the meantime, continued West European criticism of the military government probably will fan resentment in military circles and encourage the government to take harsher action against domestic opponents. There is a strong chance that civilian critics in Turkey will soon begin to vent their frustrations on the US, which increasingly is identified as the principal backer of the military regime.//	25)
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//Many of these critics are likel	
inently in future civilian governments	
US could come under even heavier criti	
return to powerprobably in the sprin	ng of 1984espe-
cially if the military's reforms fail	to achieve their
intended goals.//	

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